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Ivan S. Kavrukov Cooper & Dunham LLP 1185 Avenue of the Americas New York, NY 10036			EXAMINER FISCHER, ANDREW J	
			ART UNIT	PAPER NUMBER
			3627	
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Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.

**Office Action Summary**

Application No.

09/815,134

Applicant(s)

UCHIDA, YUKI

Examiner

Andrew J. Fischer

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-- The MAILING DATE of this communication appears on the cover sheet with the correspondence address --  
Period for Reply

A SHORTENED STATUTORY PERIOD FOR REPLY IS SET TO EXPIRE 3 MONTH(S) OR THIRTY (30) DAYS, WHICHEVER IS LONGER, FROM THE MAILING DATE OF THIS COMMUNICATION.

- Extensions of time may be available under the provisions of 37 CFR 1.136(a). In no event, however, may a reply be timely filed after SIX (6) MONTHS from the mailing date of this communication.
- If NO period for reply is specified above, the maximum statutory period will apply and will expire SIX (6) MONTHS from the mailing date of this communication.
- Failure to reply within the set or extended period for reply will, by statute, cause the application to become ABANDONED (35 U.S.C. § 133). Any reply received by the Office later than three months after the mailing date of this communication, even if timely filed, may reduce any earned patent term adjustment. See 37 CFR 1.704(b).

**Status**

- 1) ☒ Responsive to communication(s) filed on 14 October 2005.
- 2a) ☒ This action is **FINAL**. 2b) ☐ This action is non-final.
- 3) ☐ Since this application is in condition for allowance except for formal matters, prosecution as to the merits is closed in accordance with the practice under *Ex parte Quayle*, 1935 C.D. 11, 453 O.G. 213.

**Disposition of Claims**

- 4) ☒ Claim(s) 1-10 and 24 is/are pending in the application.
- 4a) Of the above claim(s) \_\_\_\_\_ is/are withdrawn from consideration.
- 5) ☐ Claim(s) \_\_\_\_\_ is/are allowed.
- 6) ☒ Claim(s) 1-10 and 24 is/are rejected.
- 7) ☐ Claim(s) \_\_\_\_\_ is/are objected to.
- 8) ☐ Claim(s) \_\_\_\_\_ are subject to restriction and/or election requirement.

**Application Papers**

- 9) ☐ The specification is objected to by the Examiner.
- 10) ☐ The drawing(s) filed on \_\_\_\_\_ is/are: a) ☐ accepted or b) ☐ objected to by the Examiner.  
Applicant may not request that any objection to the drawing(s) be held in abeyance. See 37 CFR 1.85(a).  
Replacement drawing sheet(s) including the correction is required if the drawing(s) is objected to. See 37 CFR 1.121(d).
- 11) ☐ The oath or declaration is objected to by the Examiner. Note the attached Office Action or form PTO-152.

**Priority under 35 U.S.C. § 119**

- 12) ☐ Acknowledgment is made of a claim for foreign priority under 35 U.S.C. § 119(a)-(d) or (f).
- a) ☐ All b) ☐ Some \* c) ☐ None of:
- ☐ Certified copies of the priority documents have been received.
  - ☐ Certified copies of the priority documents have been received in Application No. \_\_\_\_\_.
  - ☐ Copies of the certified copies of the priority documents have been received in this National Stage application from the International Bureau (PCT Rule 17.2(a)).
- \* See the attached detailed Office action for a list of the certified copies not received.

**Attachment(s)**

- |  |   |
|--|---|
| 1) <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Notice of References Cited (PTO-892)  | 4) <input type="checkbox"/> Interview Summary (PTO-413)<br>Paper No(s)/Mail Date. _____ |
| 2) <input type="checkbox"/> Notice of Draftsperson's Patent Drawing Review (PTO-948)                                   | 5) <input type="checkbox"/> Notice of Informal Patent Application (PTO-152)             |
| 3) <input type="checkbox"/> Information Disclosure Statement(s) (PTO-1449 or PTO/SB/08)<br>Paper No(s)/Mail Date _____ | 6) <input type="checkbox"/> Other: _____  |

## **DETAILED ACTION**

### ***Acknowledgements***

1. Applicant's amendment filed October 14, 2005 is acknowledged. Accordingly, claims 1-10 and 24 remain pending.
2. This Office Action, the "Second Final Office Action" is given Paper No. 20060105.
3. All references in this Office Action to the capitalized versions of "Applicant" refers specifically the Applicant of record. References to lower case versions of "applicant" or "applicants" refers to any or all patent "applicants." Unless expressly noted otherwise, references to "Examiner" in this Office Action refers to the Examiner of record while reference to or use of the lower case version of "examiner" or "examiners" refers to examiner(s) generally.
4. This Office Action is written in OACS. Because of this, the Examiner is unable to control formatting, paragraph numbering, font, spelling, line spacing, and/or other word processing issues. The Examiner sincerely apologies for these errors.

### ***Claim Rejections - 35 USC §112 2<sup>nd</sup> Paragraph***

5. The following is a quotation of the 2<sup>nd</sup> paragraph of 35 U.S.C. §112:  

The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.
6. Claims 1-10 and 24 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. §112, 2<sup>nd</sup> paragraph, as being indefinite for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which applicant regards as the invention.

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- a. In claims 1 and 6, the phrase “with a selected aspect” is unclear. With a selected aspect of what?
- b. Also in claims 1 and 6, it is unclear what is “at said user-side . . . .” For prior art purposes only, the Examiner interprets a/said “user-side” to mean a printer that is a particular side of a room.
- c. Also in claims 1-6, it is unclear what specific steps are “without the need for user action . . . .” Does this mean all steps, some steps, or a few steps are “without the need for user action?”
- d. In claim 3, it is unclear who is “automatically recognizing . . . .”

***Claim Rejections - 35 USC §102***

7. The following is a quotation of the appropriate paragraphs of 35 U.S.C. §102 that form the basis for the rejections under this section made in this Office Action:

A person shall be entitled to a patent unless –

(a) the invention was known or used by others in this country, or patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country, before the invention thereof by the applicant for a patent.

(b) the invention was patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country or in public use or on sale in this country, more than one year prior to the date of application for patent in the United States. . . .

(e) the invention was described in (1) an application for patent, published under section 122(b), by another filed in the United States before the invention by the applicant for patent or (2) a patent granted on an application for patent by another filed in the United States before the invention by the applicant for patent, except that an international application filed under the treaty defined in section 351(a) shall have the effects for purposes of this subsection of an application filed in the United States only if the international application designated the United States and was published under Article 21(2) of such treaty in the English language.

8. Claims 1-10 and 24, as understood by the Examiner, are rejected under 35 U.S.C. §102(e) as being anticipated by Sloane et. al. (U.S. 6,434,530 B1)(“Sloane”). Sloane discloses automatically identifying, without reliance on user action, a selected aspect of information regarding the electronic transaction (e.g. price of each item and total cost) in an electronic

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communication between the user-side (the customer) and the supplier-side (the seller); generating a print request (performed automatically by the software); sending said print request to a printing apparatus (to printer 708); printing information regarding the electronic transaction in response to the print request (the customer's receipt is printed); notifying a control apparatus of communication between the user-side and supplier-side.

***Claim Rejections - 35 USC §103***

9. The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. §103(a) which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office Action:

(a) A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed or described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.

10. Claims 1-10 and 24, as understood by the Examiner, are alternatively rejected under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being unpatentable over Sloane.<sup>1</sup> It is the Examiner's principle position that the claims are anticipated because Sloane inherently discloses the automatically identifying since a computer performs the 'automated' tasks without user input.

However if not inherent, it would have been obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made to modify Sloane to expressly include the automatic identifying. Such a modification would have discloses well known computer science algorithms whereby computers perform various tasks without subsequent user input.

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<sup>1</sup> See MPEP §2112 expressly authorizing alternative §102/§103 rejections when the question of inherency is present in the anticipation rejection.

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11. Claims 1-4 and 6-9, as understood by the Examiner, are rejected under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being unpatentable what is well known in the art. Applicant's original specification describes solutions and notes that "[i]n another method, the record information is printed as a result of an instruction on the supplier side of the communication with the paper copy of the record being mailed to the user subsequently."<sup>2</sup> While Applicant's specification does not directly "automatically identifying without user action," the specification offers indirect or circumstantial evidence that this is inherent since the user has no input, no decision, or no way of controlling the printing of the receipt.

12. Claims 5 and 10, as understood by the Examiner, are rejected under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being unpatentable what is well known in the art and in further view of Dutta (U.S. 6,681,246 B1). What is known in the art discloses as discussed above. However, it is not directly disclosed to have the printing occurring on the user's side. Dutta teaches having receipt information automatically printed at a user's computer. Therefore it would have been obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made to modify the prior art to include Dutta's ability to push receipt information to a user's printer. Such a modification would have given the user immediate notice of their purchase.

13. Claims 5 and 10, as understood by the Examiner, are rejected under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being unpatentable over Sloane in view of Dutta. Sloane discloses as discussed above. However, it is not directly disclosed to have the printing occurring on the user's side. Dutta teaches having receipt information automatically printed at a user's computer. Therefore it would have been obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was

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<sup>2</sup> Applicant's original specification, in the "Background" section, pages 2-3.

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made to modify the prior art to include Dutta's ability to push receipt information to a user's printer. Such a modification would have given the user immediate notice of their purchase.

14. Claims 1-10 and 24, as understood by the Examiner, are rejected under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being unpatentable over Wong (U.S. 6,115,690) in view of Dutta. Wong discloses automatically identifying, without reliance on user action, a selected aspect of information regarding the electronic transaction (*e.g.* items shipped to the customer) in an electronic communication between the user-side (the customer) and the supplier-side (the seller) (the transaction was over the Internet); generating a print request (performed automatically by the software); sending said print request to a printing apparatus printing information regarding the electronic transaction in response to the print request (the packing slip is automatically printed and included in the order); notifying a control apparatus (a communications server, a bridge, or router within the Internet) of communication between the user-side and supplier-side.

15. Wong does not directly disclose sending said print request to a printing apparatus. However, because Wong directly discloses that the packing slip is automatically printed, it would have been obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made to modify Wong to expressly recite that the software sends a print request to the printer (as is the case with virtually all printers). Such a modification would have simply expressly disclosed how a standard print request is handled in an ordinary printer.

16. For due process purposes and because Applicant has not objectively indicated and redefined claim limitation(s) to have meanings other than their ordinary and accustomed meanings, the Examiner confirms that Applicant has decided not to be his own lexicographer. To support this position, the Examiner again notes the following factual findings as first

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discussed in the previous Office Actions.<sup>3</sup> First, the Examiner has again carefully reviewed the specification and prosecution history and can not locate any lexicographic definition(s). Second, the Examiner finds that not only has Applicant not pointed to definitional statements in his specification or prosecution history, Applicant has also not pointed to a term or terms in a claim with which to draw in those statements<sup>4</sup> with the required clarity, deliberateness, and precision.<sup>5</sup> Third, after receiving express notice of the Examiner's position that lexicography is *not* invoked,<sup>6</sup> Applicant's three (3) responses have not pointed out the "supposed errors" in the Examiner's position regarding lexicography invocation in accordance with 37 C.F.R. §1.111(b) (*i.e.* Applicant did not argue lexicography *was* invoked). Forth and to be sure of Applicant's intent, the Examiner also notes that Applicant has declined the Examiner's express invitation<sup>7</sup> to

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<sup>3</sup> See the Second Non Final Office Action mailed July 13, 2005, Paragraph No. 18 beginning on page 7; the First Final Office Action mailed January 6, 2005, Paragraph No. 18; and the First Non Final Office Action mailed July 14, 2004, Paragraph No. 16.

<sup>4</sup> "In order to overcome this heavy presumption in favor of the ordinary meaning of claim language, it is clear that a party wishing to use statements in the written description to confine or otherwise affect a patent's scope must, *at the very least*, point to a term or terms in the claim with which to draw in those statements. [Emphasis added.]" *Johnson Worldwide Assocs. v. Zebco Corp.*, 175 F.3d 985, 989, 50 USPQ2d 1607, 1610 (Fed. Cir. 1999).

<sup>5</sup> "The patentee's lexicography must, of course, appear 'with reasonable clarity, deliberateness, and precision' before it can affect the claim." *Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa' per Azioni*, 158 F.3d 1243, 1249, 48 USPQ2d 1117, 1121 (Fed. Cir. 1998) citing *In re Paulsen*, 30 F.3d 1475, 1480, 31 USPQ2d 1671, 1674 (Fed. Cir. 1994).

<sup>6</sup> See Note 2.

<sup>7</sup> See *e.g. Fuji Photo Film Co. v. ITC*, 386 F.3d 1095, 72 USPQ2d 1769, 1773 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (noting that applicants' failure to correct the examiner's characterization of an element of claim interpretation is nevertheless an indication of how a claim should be interpreted since applicant declined the examiner's express invitation to correct a possible error in claim interpretation: "applicant's attention was called to the examiner's interpretation of [how the element was



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be his own lexicographer. Finally, after receiving express notice of the preceding factual findings and conclusions, Applicant's latest response again fails to point out the supposed errors in the Examiner's position regarding lexicography invocation in accordance with 37 C.F.R. §1.111(b). Moreover, Applicant's latest response—while fully considered by the Examiner—has not changed the Examiner's reasonable conclusion that Applicant has decided not to be his own lexicographer. Therefore (and unless expressly noted otherwise by the Examiner), the heavy presumption in favor of the ordinary and accustomed meaning for claim terminology is again confirmed. Accordingly, the claims continue to be interpreted with their "broadest reasonable interpretation," *In re Morris*, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054, 44 USPQ2d 1023, 1027 (Fed. Cir. 1997), and the Examiner continues to rely heavily and extensively on this interpretation.<sup>8</sup>

17. The Examiner maintains his interpretations as stated in the previous Office Actions. Again, to the extent that the Examiner's interpretations are either different from or in dispute with Applicants' interpretations, the Examiner hereby adopts the following additional definitions—under the broadest reasonable interpretation standard—in all his claim interpretations. Moreover, the following definition(s) are provided in accordance with *In re Morris* and are not intended to be exhaustive in any way.

***Automatic*** "1 a : largely or wholly involuntary;" Merriam-Webster's Collegiate

Dictionary, 10<sup>th</sup> Edition, Merriam-Webster Inc., Springfield, M.A., 1997.

***Information*** "2 a . . . (3): FACTS, DATA" Id.

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interpreted by the examiner, and] applicant was invited to correct the examiner's interpretation—an invitation the applicant did not accept."

<sup>8</sup> See 37 C.F.R. §1.104(c)(3) which states in part: "the examiner may rely upon admissions by applicant . . . as to *any matter* affecting patentability . . . . [Emphasis added.]"

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18. Because applicants frequently misunderstand the historical order of definitions and their corresponding senses, the following excerpts from the “Explanatory Notes” in Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary are provided:

**Definitions**

**Division of Senses**

A boldface colon is used in this dictionary to introduce a definition. . . . It is also used to separate two or more definitions of a single sense. . . . Boldface Arabic numerals separate senses of a word that has more than one sense. . . . Boldface lowercase letters separate the subsenses of a word. . . . Lightface numerals in parentheses indicate a further division of senses. . . .

**Order of Senses**

The order of senses within an entry is historical: the sense known to have been first used in English is entered first. This is not to be taken to mean, however, that each sense of a multisense word developed from the immediately preceding sense. It is altogether possible that sense 1 of a word has given rise to sense 2 and sense 2 to sense 3, but frequently sense 2 and sense 3 may have risen independently of one another from sense 1.

19. When a number sense is further subdivided into lettered subsenses, the inclusion of particular subsenses with a sense is based upon their semantic relationship to one another, but their order is likewise historical: subsense 1a is earlier than subsense 1b, 1b is earlier than 1c, and so forth. Divisions of subsenses indicated by lightface numerals in parentheses are also in historical order with respect to one another. Subsenses may be out of historical order, however, with respect to the broader numbered senses. Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary, pp 19a-20a.

20. The Examiner maintains his position that the application does not contain any product-by-process claims.

*Response to Arguments*

21. Applicant's arguments filed October 14, 2005 have been fully considered but they are not persuasive.

22. The one page drawing filed October 14, 2005 is approved by the Examiner and has been entered.

23. In response to the prior art rejections of Sloane, Applicant argues:

In any event, Sloane simply does not disclose or suggest a method for automatically printing, without a need for user action, a hard copy of transaction information relating to a transaction conducted electronically between a user-side and a supplier-side (each of independent claims 1 and 6) which includes (a) automatically identifying information including at least one of a confirmation number, password and invoice information concerning electronic commerce with a selected aspect, (b) automatically generating a print request by extracting electronic commerce information corresponding to the automatically identified information, (c) sending the print request to a printing apparatus at the user-side, and (d) printing information regarding the electronic transaction in response to the print request.<sup>9</sup>

24. The Examiner respectfully disagrees. First, Applicant has in a sense, recited the entire claims without point to an explicit feature not found in Sloane. Applicant's arguments would make sense only if Sloan does not disclose a single claimed element identified by Applicant. However Sloane for example clearly discloses 'automatically printing' because when a user presses e.g. a print button, practically all personal computers 'automatically print' the desired pages. Thus, it is unclear what Applicant believes Sloane does not disclose. For this reason alone, Applicant's arguments are not persuasive. Additionally, a printer that prints records of incoming orders to store for tax or 'back-up' purposes prints the receipts on a "user-side" printer even though the printer may be in the seller's office.

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<sup>9</sup> Applicant's "Remarks" filed October 14, 2005, pages 9-10.

***Regarding Indefiniteness Under 35 USC §112 2<sup>nd</sup> Paragraph<sup>10</sup>***

25. First, the Examiner notes that the primary purpose of the definiteness requirement is to provide notice. “The primary purpose of the definiteness requirement is to ensure that the claims are written in such a way that they give notice to the public of the extent of the legal protection afforded by the patent, so that interested members of the public, e.g., competitors of the patent owner, can determine whether or not they infringe. That determination requires a construction of the claims according to the familiar canons of claim construction.” *All Dental Prodx, LLC v. Advantage Dental Products, Inc.*, 309 F.3d 774, 779-80, 64 USPQ2d 1945, 1949 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (citations omitted).

26. Second, it is the Examiner’s position that during ex parte examination, if a claim in a utility patent application is indefinite on its face, the claim is indefinite. “If the scope of the invention sought to be patented is unclear from the language of the claim, a second paragraph rejection will properly lie.” *In re Wiggins*, 488 F.2d 538, 179 USPQ 421, 423 (CCPA 1973) (citations and quotations omitted).

27. Third, if a claim is indefinite under 35 U.S.C. §112 2<sup>nd</sup> paragraph, it is impossible to completely and accurately construe claim of the claim. See *Honeywell International Inc. v. ITC*, 68 USPQ2d 1023, 1030 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“Because the claims are indefinite, the claims, by definition, cannot be construed.”). However, in accordance with MPEP §2173.06 and the

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<sup>10</sup> Because this application has now been at least twice rejected and is therefore eligible for appeal to the USPTO’s Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (“Board”), because of recent decisions by the Board and the Board’s position on indefiniteness, and in order to help and enable Applicant(s) to craft reasoned arguments should Applicant(s) eventually decide to appeal an indefiniteness rejection to the Board, the Examiner has provided the following discussion on 35 USC §112 2<sup>nd</sup> Paragraph and indefiniteness.

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USPTO's policy of trying to advance prosecution by providing art rejections even though these claim are indefinite, the claims are construed and the art is applied *as much as practically possible*.

28. Forth, the Examiner recognizes that breath of a claim is not be equated with indefiniteness. *In re Miller*, 441 F.2d 689, 169 USPQ 597 (CCPA 1971). However, "[i]f the language of the claim is such that a person of ordinary skill in the art could not interpret the metes and bounds of the claim so as to understand how to avoid infringement, a rejection of the claim under 35 U.S.C. 112, second paragraph would be appropriate." MPEP §2173.02 citing *Morton Int'l, Inc. v. Cardinal Chem. Co.*, 5 F.3d 1464, 1470, 28 USPQ2d 1190, 1195 (Fed. Cir. 1993). In other words, claim breath indicates the range or scope a claim limitation covers while the metes and bounds indicate where the claimed subject matter begins and ends. These are two principles are distinct and separate principles. A broad claim—like a narrow claim—may or may not have clear metes and bounds and thus may or may not be definite. Thus, if a person of ordinary skill in the art could not interpret the metes and bounds of a claim—even a broad claim—so as to understand how to avoid infringement, the claim is indefinite as well as broad.

29. Fifth, a claim in a utility patent application is either indefinite under 35 U.S.C. §112, 2<sup>nd</sup> paragraph or it is not. Contrary to recent decisions of the USPTO's Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences ("Board"), the law does not recognize a 'scale' or 'range' of indefiniteness such as 'slightly indefinite,' 'somewhat indefinite,' or 'not too indefinite.' There is no middle ground since at the end of the day, 'slightly indefinite,' 'somewhat indefinite,' or 'not too indefinite' are nevertheless still indefinite. The Examiner frequently receives arguments from applicants and

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decisions from the Board where the parties respectively argue that ‘the examiner knows what is meant by the term’ or ‘the language is clear from the specification.’ However these arguments can not overcome claim language that is indefinite on its face. In other words, “semantic indefiniteness of claims is not rendered unobjectionable merely because it *could* have been corrected. [Emphasis in original.]” *Allen Engineering Corp. v. Bartell Industries Inc.*, 299 F.3d 1336, 1349, 63 USPQ2d 1769, 1776 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (citations and quotations omitted).<sup>11</sup> Again, so as to be especially clear, a claim is either indefinite—or it is not indefinite. When the claim is indefinite, the claim by definition, can not be construed. And if the indefiniteness is rendered during ex parte examination, neither the specification nor the prosecution history can be used to rectify the indefiniteness.<sup>12</sup>

30. Sixth, the Examiner recognizes that “compliance with Section 112 Para. 2 is a question of law.” *In re Dossel*, 115 F.3d 942, 944, 42 USPQ2d 1881, 1883 (Fed. Cir. 1997). Additionally, when questions of indefiniteness arise, we use general principles of claim construction. “In the face of an allegation of indefiniteness, general principles of claim construction apply.” *Datamize LLC v. Plumtree Software Inc.*, 417 F.3d 1342, 75 USPQ2d 1801, 1805 (Fed Cir. 2005) citing *Oakley, Inc. v. Sunglass Hut Int’l*, 316 F.3d 1331, 1340-41, 65 USPQ2d 1321, 1326 (Fed. Cir.

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<sup>11</sup> As a practical matter, a patent applicant almost always has an opportunity to correct indefiniteness by filing either an amendment to a non final office action, or alternatively if in response to a final office action, a request for continued examination under 37 C.F.R. §1.114 along with an amendment.

<sup>12</sup> Compare *Exxon Research and Engineering Co. v. U.S.*, 265 F.3d 1371, 60 USPQ2d 1272 (Fed. Cir. 2001) vs. *In re Jolly*, 172 F.2d 566, 80 USPQ 504 (CCPA 1949). In *Exxon Research*, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed “similar claim language” as was interpreted in *Jolly* (where the language in question was held to be indefinite) and held that for purposes of indefiniteness, claims are interpreted differently during ex parte examination than the same claim phases during inter parte litigation.

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2003) (noting that a determination of definiteness “requires a construction of the claims according to the familiar canons of claim construction”). However, a patent claim that is indefinite on its face can not be rendered ‘definite’ by a reviewing body simply because the result would otherwise be inequitable or unfair to applicant, because the result would otherwise be too harsh or severe since it might result in the patent application becoming abandoned, or because rendering the claim indefinite is against some noble policy. “Claim construction, however, is not a policy-driven inquiry. As stated earlier, it is a contextual interpretation of language. The scope of patent claims can neither be broadened nor narrowed based on abstract policy considerations regarding the effect of a particular claim meaning.” *SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp.*, 365 F.3d 1306, 70 USPQ2d 1737, 1742-43 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (quoting *Quantum Corp. v. Rodime, PLC*, 65 F.3d 1577, 1584, 36 USPQ2d 1162, 1168 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“[I]t is well settled that no matter how great the temptations of fairness or policy making, courts do not redraft claims”), *vacated on other grounds by* 403 F.3d 1328, 74 USPQ2d 1396 (Fed. Cir. 2005)(en banc).

31. Seventh, should Applicants appeal this application and should the Board have any questions regarding indefiniteness under 35 U.S.C. §112, 2<sup>nd</sup> paragraph and its application during ex parte examination when compared with inter parte litigation, the Examiner respectfully requests the Board to remand this application to the Examiner in order to provide additional guidance.

32. The Examiner concludes this section by reiterating that during ex parte examination, when a patent claim is rejected for indefiniteness because the claim is indefinite on its face, the

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claim can not be construed. In such a case, the application of prior art by an examiner or the Board is immaterial. Yet in order to avoid piecemeal examination, MPEP §2173.06 states that even if the examiner takes a position that a claim is indefinite, it is USPTO policy to nevertheless make an attempt at application of the prior art. However, neither this policy decision as set forth in MPEP §2173.06 nor even *any* policy decision by the USPTO can change the substantive standard for indefiniteness and thus the standard for a 35 U.S.C. §112 2<sup>nd</sup> paragraph rejection.<sup>13</sup> So no matter how slight the indefiniteness may be, no matter how equitable applicant's arguments may seem, and no matter how great the temptations of fairness or policy making may appear to the Board, during ex parte examination, if a claim is indefinite on its face, the claim is just that—indefinite.

### *Conclusion*

33. Applicant's amendment filed October 25, 2005 necessitated the new ground(s) of rejection presented in this Office action. Accordingly, **THIS ACTION IS MADE FINAL**. See MPEP §706.07(a). Applicant is reminded of the extension of time policy as set forth in 37 C.F.R. §1.136(a).

A shortened statutory period for reply to this final action is set to expire **THREE MONTHS** from the mailing date of this action. In the event a first reply is filed within **TWO MONTHS** of the mailing date of this final action and the advisory action is not mailed until after

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<sup>13</sup> See *Merck & Co. v. Kessler*, 80 F.3d 1543, 1559, 38 USPQ2d 1347, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“As we [the Federal Circuit] have previously held, the broadest of the PTO's rulemaking powers—35 U.S.C. Section 6(a)—authorizes the Commissioner to promulgate regulations directed only to ‘the conduct of proceedings in the [PTO]’; it does not grant the Commissioner the authority to issue substantive rules.”).



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the end of the THREE-MONTH shortened statutory period, then the shortened statutory period will expire on the date the advisory action is mailed, and any extension fee pursuant to 37 C.F.R. §1.136(a) will be calculated from the mailing date of the advisory action. In no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire later than SIX MONTHS from the date of this final action.

34. References considered pertinent to Applicant's disclosure are listed on form PTO-892. All references listed on form PTO-892 are cited in their entirety.

35. Unless expressly noted otherwise by the Examiner or other USPTO official, the following four (4) citations to the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure ("MPEP") apply to this Office Action *and* any future office action(s), communication(s), or other correspondence provided by the USPTO: MPEP citations to Chapter 2300 are from the MPEP 8<sup>th</sup> Edition, Rev. 4, October 2005; citations to Chapters 200-900, 1200-1400, and 1700-1900, 2100, 2200, 2600 are from the MPEP 8<sup>th</sup> Edition, Rev. 3, August 2005. MPEP citations to Chapters 100, 1000, 1100, 1500, 2000, 2500, and 2700 are from the MPEP 8<sup>th</sup> Edition, Rev. 2, May 2004. MPEP citations to Chapters 1600, 2300, 2400 are from MPEP 8<sup>th</sup> Edition, August 2001.

36. Information regarding the status of an application may be obtained from the Patent Application Information Retrieval (PAIR) system. Status information for published applications may be obtained from either Private PAIR or Public PAIR. Status information for unpublished applications is available through Private PAIR only. For more information about the PAIR system, see <http://pair-direct.uspto.gov>. Should you have questions on access to the Private PAIR system, contact the Electronic Business Center (EBC) at 866-217-9197 (toll-free).

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37. Applicant is also reminded that patents are written by and for skilled artisans. See *Vivid Technologies, Inc. v. American Science and Engineering, Inc.*, 200 F.3d 795, 804, 53 USPQ2d 1289, 1295 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“patents are written by and for skilled artisans”). The Examiner therefore starts with the presumption that Applicants are skilled artisans who possess at least ordinary skill in the art. Consequently, it is the Examiner’s position that because the patent references of record are directed to those with ordinary skill in this art, these references are clear, explicit, and specific as to what they teach. Nevertheless some applicants apparently have difficulty understanding the references. In an effort to maintain compact prosecution, provide due process, and to help these applicants understand the contents of a reference when viewed from the position of one of ordinary skill in this art, Applicant is hereby given actual notice that if after reasonably reading any reference of record—whether the reference is currently of record or subsequently made of record—if Applicant can not reasonably understand or if Applicant has difficulty comprehending one or more sentence(s), statement(s), diagram(s), or principle(s) set forth in one or more of the reference(s) of record, Applicant should (in his next appropriately filed response) bring this issue to the attention of the Examiner. In addition to bringing this issue to the attention of the Examiner, and in accordance with 37 C.F.R. §1.111(b), Applicant’s response must also state *why* he either does not understand or *why* he has difficulty comprehending the reference. If after properly receiving (*i.e.* Applicant’s response is made of record) both Applicant’s request for understanding and the reasons as to *why* the request is made—and assuming the reference is germane to at least one outstanding rejection—the Examiner may either provide a substitute reference, or alternatively, do his best to elucidate the particular sentence(s), statement(s), diagram(s), or principles(s) at issue in a reasonable manner.

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For all documents or references made of record after this Office Action, Applicant is given actual notice that this paragraph becomes effective when Applicant receives notice that the document or reference is made of record (*i.e.* this paragraph becomes applicable when Applicant submits an Information Disclosure Sheet or when Applicant receives an examiner's Notice of References Cited (Form PTO-892)).

38. Because this application is now final, Applicant is also reminded of the USPTO's after final practice as discussed in MPEP §714.12 and §714.13 and that entry of amendments after final is *not* a matter of right. "The refusal of an examiner to enter an amendment after final rejection of claims is a matter of discretion." *In re Berger*, 279 F.3d 975, 984, 61 USPQ2d 1523, 1529 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (citations omitted). Furthermore, suggestions or examples of claim language provided by the Examiner are just that—suggestions or examples—and do not constitute a formal requirement mandated by the Examiner. Unless stated otherwise by an express indication that a claim is "allowed," exemplary claim language provided by the Examiner to overcome a particular rejection or to change claim interpretation has *not been addressed* with respect to other aspects of patentability (*e.g.* §101 patentable subject matter, §112 1<sup>st</sup> paragraph written description and enablement, §112 2<sup>nd</sup> paragraph indefiniteness, and §102 and §103 prior art). Therefore, any claim amendment submitted under 37 C.F.R. §1.116 that incorporates an Examiner suggestion or example or simply changes claim interpretation will nevertheless require further consideration and/or search and a patentability determination as noted above.

39. Additionally, Applicant is reminded that it is inappropriate for the USPTO to disregard any relevant evidence. "It is jurisprudentially inappropriate to disregard any relevant evidence

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on any issue in any case, patent cases included.” *Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp.*, 713 F.2d 1530, 218 USPQ 871, 879 (Fed. Cir. 1983). Second, when making substantive patentability determinations, it is clear error for the USPTO not to consider *all* evidence of record. See *e.g. In re Piasecki*, 745 F.2d 1468, 1471, 223 USPQ 785, 787 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (“All the evidence on the question of obviousness must be considered.”); *In re Oetiker*, 977 F.2d 1443, 1445, 24 USPQ2d 1443, 1444 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (“After evidence or argument is submitted by the applicant in response, patentability is determined on *the totality of the record*, by a preponderance of evidence with due consideration to persuasiveness of argument. [Emphasis added.]”); *In re Glaug*, 283 F.3d 1335, 1338, 62 USPQ2d 1151, 1152-53 (Fed. Cir. 2002)(“Patentability vel non is then determined on the *entirety* of the record, by a preponderance of evidence and weight of argument. . . . ; patentability is determined by a preponderance of *all* the evidence. [Emphasis added.]”); and *In re Rinehart*, 531 F.2d 1048, 189 USPQ 143, 146 (CCPA 1976)(where the court expressly set forth the issue as “Whether, in light of *all the evidence*, the claimed method would have been obvious at the time the invention was made. [Emphasis added.]”). Third, any factual determination by the USPTO that does not consider *all* relevant evidence may not be supported by substantial evidence<sup>14</sup> since the particular evidence *not* considered may be probative of a factual issue presented. Forth, it is well established that “[a] reference anticipates a claim if it discloses the claimed invention ‘such that a skilled artisan could take its teachings in combination with his own knowledge of the particular art and be in possession of the invention. [Emphasis in original.]’” *In re Graves*, 69 F.3d 1147, 1152, 36 USPQ2d 1697, 1701 (Fed. Cir.

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<sup>14</sup> Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” *Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB*, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938).

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1995) citing *In re LeGrice*, 301 F.2d 929, 936, 133 USPQ 365, 372 (CCPA 1962) and noting that regarding the claimed “simultaneously monitoring the selected multiple connection points,” the prior art “nevertheless anticipates [the claimed invention], even if it does not specifically disclose simultaneous monitoring of the output points, if simultaneous or parallel monitoring is within the knowledge of a skilled artisan.” *Graves*, 69 F.3d at 1152, 36 USPQ2d at 1701.<sup>15</sup>

Therefore because, inter alia, it is inappropriate for the USPTO to disregard any relevant evidence, because the USPTO must consider all evidence of record, because any evidence *not* considered by the USPTO may be probative of at least one factual issue presented, and because anticipation is determined by the teachings of a reference in combination with the knowledge of one of ordinary skill in the art, Applicant is hereby given actual notice that all prior art rejections (*i.e.* rejection(s) based upon 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 or 103)—if found in this Office Action or any subsequent office action—are based upon the cited reference(s) in the statement of the rejection in combination with the knowledge of one of ordinary skill in this art.

40. In accordance with the USPTO’s goals of customer service, compact prosecution, and reduction of cycle time, the Examiner has made every effort to clarify his position regarding claim interpretation and any rejections or objections in this application. Furthermore, the Examiner has again provided Applicants with notice—for due process purposes—of his position regarding his factual determinations and legal conclusions. The Examiner notes and thanks Applicant for his “Remarks” (beginning on page 7) traversing the Examiner’s positions on various points. If Applicant disagrees with any additional factual determination or legal

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<sup>15</sup> See also *In re Donohue*, 766 F.2d 531, 533, 226 USPQ 619, 621 (Fed. Cir. 1985) for the same statement of law and also citing *In re LeGrice*.

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conclusion made by the Examiner in this Office Action whether expressly stated or implied,<sup>16</sup> the Examiner respectfully reminds Applicant to properly traverse the Examiner's position(s) in accordance with 37 C.F.R. §1.111(b) in his next properly filed response. By addressing these issues now, matters where the Examiner and Applicant agree can be eliminated allowing the Examiner and Applicant to focus on areas of disagreement (if any) with the goal towards allowance in the shortest possible time. If Applicant has any questions regarding the Examiner's positions or has other questions regarding this communication or even previous communications, Applicant is strongly encouraged to contact Examiner Andrew J. Fischer whose telephone number is (571) 272-6779. If attempts to reach the Examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the Examiner's immediate supervisor, Alexander Kalinowski, can be reached at (571) 272-6771. The fax number for facsimile responses is now (571) 273-8300.



Andrew J. Fischer  
Primary Examiner  
Art Unit 3627

AJF  
January 5, 2005

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<sup>16</sup> *E.g.*, if the Examiner rejected a claim under §103 with two references, although not directly stated, it is the Examiner's implied position that the references are analogous art.

PRIOR ART





Fig. 1

Approved  
1/6/06